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HOW ARE PROFESSIONALS RECRUITED BY EXTERNAL AGENTS IN MISCONDUCT 1 
PROJECTS? The infiltration of organized crime in a university 2 
ABSTRACT 3 
Private firms, crime organizations or states may successfully recruit professionals in misconduct 4 
projects. How they do so remains however under-investigated. Past studies mostly take 5 
professionals’ perspective, or limit the organizational initiative of external agents to perverse 6 
incentives and threats. Our study shows instead how external agents may penetrate governance 7 
bodies and professional events to recruit and control professionals, who are both aware of and 8 
reluctant toward misconduct. Our longitudinal case study used judicial and non-judicial sources to 9 
analyse how a mafia clan infiltrated Troy University, and controlled the trade of exams and 10 
admissions for decades. The clan selected Troy University because of the presence of professors 11 
pre-disposed toward misconduct. The clan infiltrated the pre-disposed professors inside governance 12 
bodies and students inside academic events to recruit the reluctant professors with peer pressures, 13 
situated threats and administrative controls. It then exploited a generalized code of silence to control 14 
professionals for years. Overall, the study highlights the combination of perverse and pervasive 15 
mechanisms to recruit professionals; the role of corrupt professionals as lynchpin between external 16 
agents and reluctant peers; and the perverse exploitation of normal professional practices of 17 
autonomy, trusteeship and multiple embeddedness. 18 
INTRODUCTION 19 
Professional misconduct is generally regarded an aberration that undermines the usefulness and 20 
legitimacy of professions in society (Dinovitzer et al., 2015; Muzio et al., 2016). Yet, professional 21 
misconduct might interest external agents, such as corporations, state, private users and organized 22 
crime (Dinovitzer et al., 2014; Gunz and Gunz, 2006; Newburn, 2017). The appeal of professional 23 
misconduct is twofold. First, professionals control key services, such as education, healthcare, 24 
arbitrations and auditing. By steering professionals towards misconduct, external agents may obtain 25 
important benefits or remove crucial barriers. Enron and Parmalat, for instance, exploited auditors’ 26 
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misconduct to thrive financially (Grey, 2003; Sikka, 2009). Second, professional misconduct is hard 27 
to detect for non-professional actors. Professional work requires expert knowledge that is 28 
inaccessible to most, so that professional decisions cannot be fully standardized or scrutinized 29 
externally (Abbott, 1988; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Professional work is subject to peer reviews, 30 
but peers may be reluctant to condemn colleagues (Finn and Lampe, 1992; Kovach et al., 2009). 31 
The deterioration of professional practices is thus difficult to detect when external agents ‘hide’ 32 
behind professionals. Again, firms like Enron and Parmalat exploited auditors’ misconduct as 33 
professional peers struggled to recognize and report any wrongdoing (Gabbioneta et al., 2013; 34 
Mitchell and Sikka, 2011). Accordingly, external agents try to facilitate and control professional 35 
misconduct (Dinovitzer et al., 2014; Muzio et al., 2016). Medical studies have reported several 36 
attempts by pharmaceutical companies to influence drug prescriptions in general practice 37 
(Moynihan and Cassels, 2008). Similarly, historical studies have reported attempts by dictators to 38 
deviate the work of judges, lawyers, engineers and educators (e.g. Jarausch, 1990).  39 
While it is understood that external agents may interfere with professional work, in-depth analyses 40 
of how they intentionally do so remain scarce and sparse (Muzio et al., 2013; 2016; Newburn, 2017; 41 
Palmer, 2012). Past research has mostly taken the perspective of the captured professionals, 42 
explaining the perverse and pervasive reasons why they engage in misconduct, and how they 43 
respond to external stimuli (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011; Muzio et al., 2016; Palmer, 2012). 44 
Significantly less is known from the perspective of the capturing agents, and particularly about their 45 
capacity as external agents to penetrate organizational boundaries and recruit professionals in a 46 
misconduct project. Misconduct project represent the deliberate attempt of external agents to 47 
deviate professionals from their code of conduct; and to exploit the resources and influence of the 48 
recruited professionals to advance their private agenda. Some studies investigated how non-49 
professional actors embedded in the organization (e.g. managers) try to influence professional work, 50 
typically toward better conduct and ineffectively (Currie et al., 2012; Llewellyn, 2001; Radaelli et 51 
al., 2017). Others showed how social agents external to both profession and organization try to 52 
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influence the field in which these operate, typically toward better conduct and ineffectively 53 
(Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Muzio et al., 2016). Differently, we ask: how do external agents penetrate 54 
professional organizations, recruit professionals in misconduct projects, and keep them under 55 
control?  56 
To answer this question, the present study analyses the deliberate strategies enacted by a mafia clan 57 
to recruit professors at an Italian university in their misconduct project. The mafia clan sought to 58 
facilitate the graduation of its affiliates by controlling how professors graded exams. The clan had 59 
to recruit several professors, most of whom were disinclined to pursue private interests and mafia 60 
strategies. Nevertheless, the clan successfully penetrated the university and controlled professors’ 61 
behaviours. It did so with a combination of ‘perverse’ and ‘pervasive’ mechanisms (Palmer, 2012), 62 
which (i) exploited the presence of professors already pre-disposed toward misconduct, who 63 
enacted threats and controls against the more reluctant ones; (ii) infiltrated core decision-making 64 
spaces to normalize misconduct and (iii) exploited professional features (i.e. autonomy, trusteeship, 65 
and embeddedness) that were originally intended to prevent misconduct. 66 
PERVERSE AND PERVASIVE ANTECEDENTS OF MISCONDUCT 67 
Past research identified numerous antecedents of misconduct (Muzio et al., 2016; Newburn, 2017; 68 
Palmer, 2012). Misconduct may sometimes be an ‘abnormal’ behaviour that individuals perform 69 
against their profession; or a ‘normal’ behaviour legitimized by organizations and professions. On 70 
this basis, Palmer (2012) distinguished perverse and pervasive antecedents of misconduct.  71 
Perverse antecedents are processes and structures that deviate from the professional norm of 72 
prioritizing the interests of clients and society. This perspective conceives misconduct as an 73 
aberration of ‘normal’ good conduct perpetrated by individuals who intentionally pursue their self-74 
interest against their organization and clients; or fail to account for the ethical consequences of their 75 
actions. Individuals may, for instance, accept monetary and non-monetary incentives in exchange 76 
for misconduct; or they may succumb to threats (Kish et al., 2010; Moynihan and Cassels, 2008). If 77 
the opportunities for personal incentives outweigh the risks of being sanctioned, individuals may 78 
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consider misconduct as the most rational choice (Nadler and Lawler, 1977). Professional fields may 79 
be favourable contexts for perverse mechanisms for five reasons. First, professional work has 80 
immense impacts on society – so it is likely to attract the interest of external parties (Abbott, 1986; 81 
Buonanno et al., 2015). Second, principles of autonomy and practices of self-regulation undermine 82 
managerial and regulative attempts to interfere with professional work (Currie et al., 2012; 83 
Llewellyn, 2001). Professional work acquires an “opaque quality” that cannot be fully scrutinized 84 
by non-professionals (von Nordenflycht, 2010). Professionals may thus hide their misconduct 85 
easily, especially if peers are slow or uninterested in monitoring their work (Kovach et al., 2009; 86 
McGivern and Ferlie, 2007). Third, professional organizations may attract an adverse selection of 87 
individuals. Individuals may become professionals out of vocation, and morally self-regulate 88 
against misconduct (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933). Furthermore, professional work has explicit 89 
trusteeship norms that prioritize client interest over self-interest (von Nordenflycht, 2010). 90 
However, individuals may also exploit the profession for material benefits because they may gain 91 
exposure, power and control. Fourth, peer reviews may generate tight and defensive professional 92 
groups which deny or justify misconduct to protect their members (Kellogg, 2009; Sikka, 2009). 93 
Finally, professionals may be so focused on serving the interests of their clients that they ultimately 94 
justify misconduct (Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Grey, 2003; Mitchell, 1980). 95 
Pervasive antecedents instead normalize misconduct in organizations and professions. Individuals 96 
may be misguided by existing roles and processes; or they may imitate behaviours observed in their 97 
social environment (Palmer, 2012). First, professionals may comply with inappropriate orders from 98 
their chain of command without questioning their integrity or appropriateness. Kellogg (2009), for 99 
instance, highlighted how junior doctors were pushed by their superiors to ‘soldier up’ to prevent 100 
the application of a new regulation. Second, professionals may be misguided by established rules 101 
and procedures which, even if designed to pursue clients’ interests, may still elicit wrongdoing (El-102 
Hai, 2005; Woof et al., 1999). Third, the division of labour among professionals may enable 103 
wrongdoing. When professionals lose full control of, and accountability for, a task, they may 104 
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delegate core ethical decisions to others (Solet et al., 2005; Tucker and Edmondson, 2003). Failures 105 
in communication and coordination between professionals may weaken the defences against 106 
wrongdoing, as each actor fails to act (Morris and Moore, 2000). Fourth, professionals may receive 107 
cues from peers, subordinates, and clients about the appropriate conduct to navigate uncertain 108 
scenarios; or to receive social approval. Past studies have used social information processing, social 109 
comparison and liking-based theories to highlight how individuals replicate dubious behaviours 110 
pursued by (but not sanctioned for) peers, competitors and experts (Franke et al., 2013; Scharff, 111 
2005). Professionals may replicate others’ behaviours to gain legitimacy in or reciprocity from their 112 
professional group. Gabbioneta et al. (2014), for instance, highlighted cases of institutional 113 
ascription where professionals gained their status from their association with an elite organization 114 
and replicated inappropriate behaviours observed in the network gravitating around it. 115 
EXTERNAL AGENTS AND THE PROMOTION OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT 116 
Past research mostly overlooked the capacity of external agents to penetrate organizational 117 
boundaries and recruit professionals for misconduct. Studies on the influence of external agents, 118 
e.g. corporations and states, typically focused on their attempts to facilitate the professionalization 119 
of groups or improve professionals’ code of conduct. States, for instance, comprehensively provide 120 
ad-hoc incentives and sanctions; pervasive structures, such as administrative systems, standards, 121 
and guidelines; and recruitment strategies, e.g. admission exams and public tenders, to identify 122 
appropriate professionals (Cooper and Robson, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2007).  123 
How external agents develop and implement strategies to facilitate professional misconduct remains 124 
instead scarce and sparse. Some studies reported how large corporations or associations use 125 
incentives to lure professionals, e.g. pharmaceutical companies trying to alter general practitioners’ 126 
drug prescriptions (Moynihan and Cassels, 2008), or companies gaining auditors’ support through 127 
allusive incentives (Anderson-Gough et al., 2000; Grey, 2003; Palmer, 2012). These external agents 128 
appear as tactical players which exploit shortcomings in the professional field for their self-interest, 129 
rather than being strategists which plan, design and implement ad-hoc interventions to facilitate and 130 
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control misconduct. Alternatively, external agents are described as obtuse players which create 131 
misconduct by mistake. Palmer (2012), for instance, observed how social agents may draw the line 132 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in ways that unintentionally create the conditions for misconduct. 133 
Historical accounts, by comparison, provide more direct evidence on the strategic skills of external 134 
agents to intentionally enable professional misconduct. Jarausch (1990), for instance, explained how 135 
the Nazi government altered the composition and work of multiple professions through perverse 136 
and pervasive initiatives, e.g. incentives, threats, obtrusive controls and hierarchical pressures.  137 
This body of research presents two gaps, which we seek to address. First, although we know that 138 
multiple antecedents may facilitate professional misconduct, it is still unclear what external agents 139 
actually use for this purpose. Taking the perspective of the captured professionals, past studies have 140 
focused on the key dominant interventions that ‘hit the mark’; and how these are perceived and 141 
received by the professionals. Taking the perspective of the capturing agent, we seek to provide a 142 
more comprehensive view of all the interventions as intended and enacted by the external agents. 143 
Second, previous studies focus on field-level interventions enacted by external agents to pollute the 144 
institutional context in which professionals operate. They provide limited knowledge on the 145 
capacity of external agents to breach the organizational boundaries, recruit professionals in a 146 
misconduct project, and control their behaviours over time. Our knowledge remains limited to the 147 
use of perverse mechanisms (e.g. incentives and threats), while neglecting the possibility for 148 
external agents to influence also the pervasive processes in an organization. Combining these gaps, 149 
our study thus asks: how do external agents penetrate professional organizations, recruit 150 
professionals in their misconduct projects, and keep them under control? 151 
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT  152 
To address this question, we analyse the strategy enacted by a mafia clan to recruit professors at an 153 
Italian university from the late 1970s to the early 2000s. Italian legislation defines a mafia as “an 154 
association of three or more people… whose members take advantage of intimidation, submission 155 
and a code of silence (omertà) to commit crimes, take control over economic activities or achieve 156 
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unjust advantages for themselves or others” (Article 416-bis; Italian Criminal Code). Different 157 
crime syndicates originated from different Italian regions, e.g., Cosa Nostra from Sicily, Camorra 158 
from Campania, and ‘Ndrangheta from Calabria. To preserve the confidentiality of the victims, we 159 
anonymized the university where the misconduct took place (here referred to as ‘Troy’), and the 160 
crime syndicate involved (here generically described as ‘mafia’). The mafia organization considered 161 
is a confederation of clans, each with full jurisdiction on a territory and not subordinated to other 162 
‘authorities’. Clans are family-based, as only family members inherit and hold key positions of 163 
power; external people can be enrolled however as full members, affiliates, or collaborators. The 164 
business of mafia clans is primarily illegal, e.g. drug-trafficking; fraud; loan sharking; homicide; 165 
robbery; extortion; kidnapping; tax evasion; bribery.  166 
The project of professional misconduct presented in this study involved the graduation of mafia 167 
affiliates as healthcare professionals from Troy University. The clan had a list of students (either 168 
affiliated to the clan or paying the clan for ‘favours’) who ‘had to’ pass the exam with ‘good 169 
marks’. It then recruited university professors to grade affiliates’ exams positively, making sure that 170 
every identified student quickly graduated; relax, prevent or resist peer reviews that might detect 171 
anomalies; and prevent or adjust the implementation of new regulations against mafia infiltration. 172 
The graduating affiliates would then be allocated to healthcare organizations (e.g. clinics, hospitals 173 
and commissioning groups) to enact another stage of misconduct, e.g. provide false medical reports, 174 
divert public funding, or engage in pork barrelling. In this study, we focus only on the first stage, 175 
i.e. how the mafia clan recruited university professors to facilitate the graduation of ‘its’ students.   176 
METHODS 177 
To investigate how the mafia clan recruited professors at Troy University, we employed a 178 
longitudinal case study approach (Eisenhardt et al., 2016). We selected Troy University because it 179 
represented an extreme case of an ‘abhorrent’ external agent (i.e. a mafia clan) penetrating a 180 
professional organization, recruiting professionals and controlling their misconduct for decades. 181 
The case is extreme in the intensity of professionals’ subjugation because of the methods employed 182 
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by the clan. The case reveals clear strategic intent and dynamics of professional recruitment, which 183 
are elsewhere more ambiguous. The recruitment of the Troy professors can thus “illuminate and 184 
extend relationships among constructs or develop deeper understanding of processes” (p. 1114).  185 
To analyse this phenomenon, the study used primarily legal and historical data. The role of crime 186 
syndicates in controlling professional groups is typically inaccessible to traditional research 187 
approaches (Neuman and Wiegand, 2000) because information about the violation of rules and the 188 
exploitation of people is withheld from researchers and accessible only by police forces and legal 189 
authorities. Our longitudinal analysis thus started with evidence of the misconduct (from trial 190 
verdicts) and then analysed the design and implementation of its strategy by the clan.  191 
Our data collection strategy sought a “deep immersion over time in the focal phenomena with 192 
openness to many types of rich data—from text, observations, and surveys to, more recently, 193 
Twitter feeds, YouTube videos, and Facebook posts” (Eisenhardt et al., 2016; p. 1114). As the main 194 
agents of misconduct could not be directly accessed for interviews or observations, we collected the 195 
following secondary data. Arrest warrants and trial verdicts were our main sources of data. These 196 
documents comprise a wealth of primary data collected by law enforcement and judicial actors 197 
through wiretaps and interrogations. These authorities collected information on why the clan chose 198 
Troy University, on the main actors involved, on the tactics used to recruit and control 199 
professionals, and on their consequences. The interrogations and trials were thus structured as 200 
interviews. These documents focused primarily on events that violated criminal and civil law; but 201 
they also included information on the context within which these activities were performed, e.g. on 202 
the context pre-existing the mafia infiltration or the behaviours of honest professionals and students 203 
in response to misconduct. The reliability of these sources is guaranteed by the impartiality of 204 
judges presiding over the trials; by the existence of legal processes through which defence and 205 
prosecution attorneys can dispute the validity and interpretation of every single datum (and data 206 
source); and by the availability of the trial data/results to public scrutiny. Arrest warrants, for 207 
instance, are issued by judges who review the available evidence and explain the motivations for 208 
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their decisions. We used arrest warrants not as indictments against individuals (because the trial 209 
would eventually evaluate their guilt), but rather as repositories of primary data (e.g. wiretapped 210 
conversations, interrogation quotes). More generally, our study was not focused on evaluating the 211 
decisions of the judges, but on analysing the available data on professional misconduct.  212 
Our dataset included: (i) documents on Trial A, specifically focused on the mafia recruitment of 213 
professors at Troy University and (ii) Trial B, focused on the broader strategy of infiltration of this 214 
clan in Italian public administration and private businesses. Trial A provided the main source of 215 
data. Its arrest warrants and verdicts represent large repositories of data, such as wiretaps, 216 
testimonies, police and judicial interrogations. Hence, quotes from Trial A are privileged in the 217 
findings. Trial B adds contextual data on the motivations and organization of the clan, and its 218 
actions. Contributing to the validity of the data, the trials were presided over by different judges 219 
(who cross-validated previous verdicts); and each trial went through the three judicial levels (each 220 
with different judges). Hence we had multiple triads of judges analysing the phenomenon. To be 221 
noted is that appeal and last resort for Trial A could not be accessed as they were withheld by the 222 
law courts (currently in the process of digitalizing and anonymizing the documents). We are 223 
however confident that we do not have incomplete or inappropriate data because we (i) had 224 
reassurances from the judges presiding over the missing trials that these confirmed the full trial and 225 
did not introduce radically new elements; and (ii) we collected data from journalistic and 226 
parliamentary sources, which provided day-by-day and summary proceedings of the appeal and last 227 
resort trials, and confirmed that no radical changes occurred. These data sources included: articles 228 
from local and national newspapers; books; documentaries; parliamentary documents (e.g. reports 229 
and proceedings of the Antimafia Commission). These data were important for four reasons. First, 230 
they further validated our main data as specialized journalists and commentators did not challenge 231 
the method and results of the trials. Second, we gained full access to data either reported partially or 232 
only referenced in the trial documents. Third, these sources added information about professionals’ 233 
perceptions of and opinions on the infiltration of Troy University, and more details on non-illegal 234 
10 
 
phenomena that the trial analysed briefly. Fourth, they provided information on the appeal and last 235 
resort verdicts, confirming the findings of the full trial. Ethical considerations apply to our data 236 
collection. Given the sensitive nature of the trial (with the intimidation of some individuals and 237 
legal prosecution of others), we preserved the anonymity of individuals involved in the events, 238 
excluding details on the mafia clan, and the infiltrated university, which could identify the case. We 239 
did not collect data (e.g. interviews, affidavits, reports) prepared by defence and prosecution, and 240 
not validated by independent third-parties. These data could be biased and reduce the reliability of 241 
our analysis. Table 1 describes our final dataset.  242 
[Table 1 about here] 243 
Our data analysis was informed by previous literature, which is rich with explanations as to why 244 
professionals engage in misconduct, but not how external agents design their recruitment strategies. 245 
As we could not test hypotheses, we generated theory from the data, and compared the emerging 246 
theory with existing findings on perverse and pervasive antecedents of misconduct (Palmer, 2012). 247 
We followed the advice of Eisenhardt et al. (2016), i.e. gather data “with some sort of memoing, 248 
[build] thick descriptions from the data, such as chronologies or vignettes; code raw data into first-249 
order codes or measures; raise them to a more abstract level, such as second-order themes or 250 
constructs; use constant comparison between emergent theory and data and other tactics to generate 251 
creative insights; and engage with literature to sharpen both the constructs and the theoretical logic 252 
of the relationships between constructs” (p. 1114). We organized our analytical strategy in three 253 
steps. First, we identified relevant quotes from the available data and developed provisional 254 
empirical labels. For instance, one arrest warrant specified that “Professor [R] could reach any 255 
department for misconduct, to repay the clan for money s/he had been loaned”. This quote 256 
empirically links misconduct with money repayment. Second, we aggregated similar first-order 257 
quotes into more abstract themes, informed when possible by previous literature (e.g., Palmer, 258 
2012). The above quote and similar ones, for instance, highlighted that some professors pursued 259 
misconduct for incentives. Third, we abstracted and aggregated the empirical themes in theoretical 260 
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dimensions, explaining how the perverse and pervasive approaches were combined in a 261 
comprehensive strategy. For instance, we found evidence that some professors were pre-disposed 262 
towards misconduct and were recruited with both perverse and pervasive mechanisms. The coding 263 
process is exemplified in Table 2. We identified four stages of recruitment, detailed below. 264 
[Table 2 about here] 265 
THE PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT PROJECT 266 
The clan required professors from Troy University to support the graduation of a heterogeneous 267 
cadre of students. Some students were affiliated to the mafia, which envisaged their graduation as 268 
healthcare professionals and their eventual placement in key hospitals. Others were ordinary 269 
students who paid clan intermediaries to get help with specific exams. Clan intermediaries signalled 270 
the name of these students to the ‘relevant professors’ who would: (i) provide the text and solutions 271 
of the exam beforehand; (ii) award sufficiently high marks; (iii) support their placement in ad-hoc 272 
specialization programmes. These misbehaviours created a “prodigious” increase in student 273 
performances. The corruption was so systematic and structured that Troy University became known 274 
as the “University of Exams”. The legal proceedings noted the “anomalous trajectories” of 275 
“numerous students”, who had had “more than mediocre” academic careers at other universities and 276 
then “miraculously” surged in performance once they moved to Troy. Students knew from the very 277 
beginning that they could get favourable marks in certain exams, and paid for this privilege. 278 
Knowledge of Troy University as a corrupt provider was so widespread among students that even 279 
foreign students queued to join the University to help their graduation. 280 
The clan supported internal and external students of Troy University by threatening and colluding with 281 
professors. The lower difficulty of the exams, or new attitudes towards studies cannot explain why so 282 
many students had a prodigious improvement of their marks at Troy. Corruption was so rife that students 283 
passed exams without even attending lectures or taking the exams (Verdict, Trial A).   284 
Notably, a young affiliate with a personal interest in medicine moved to another university to test 285 
her actual medical knowledge – knowing that s/he could return to Troy to obtain a good grade. 286 
Witness [A] passed three exams at Troy without any help from the clan. S/he later transferred to [an A-287 
level university] to test her real skills. The transfer decision was not problematic. If s/he failed, s/he could 288 
return to Troy and buy the exam from [professors] (Verdict, Trial A).   289 
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The misconduct was perpetrated by a heterogeneous cadre of professors at Troy. Few professors 290 
colluded with the clan; with them the clan used a combination of perverse and pervasive processes, 291 
mostly grounded on (i) the use of incentives, and (ii) hierarchical control by the mafia hierarchy. 292 
Other professors participated against their will, so that the clan employed a more forceful approach 293 
using a different combination of perverse and pervasive processes grounded on (i) the use of threats, 294 
and (ii) professional control by the administrative system, and social influence by peers.  295 
Troy University had bizarre phenomena related to exam marking. The clan obtained privileged treatment 296 
for its protégées. It exploited special relations with professors through economic exchanges, reciprocal 297 
‘respect’ or connivance. Some professors colluded with the clan, and exploited these opportunities. 298 
Others succumbed to clan threats. Only few professors opposed the clan (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 299 
SELECTING AN ‘APPROPRIATE’ CONTEXT 300 
Before recruiting the professors, the clan targeted Troy as the appropriate context for its misconduct 301 
project. It did so for a number of reasons. First, the clan had already established its authority in the 302 
area, liaising with doctors and managers of important healthcare organisations, who provided false 303 
medical reports, diverted public funding and performed pork barrelling. The capture of these 304 
individuals established the presence of the clan in the area, and opened the doors to Troy 305 
University, where they worked as professors, suppliers or administrators. 306 
Doctor [A] owned an important clinic, and was heavily involved with the clan. S/he had a tight 307 
relationship with Member [B]. [A] used her work interactions with Troy University to entice students and 308 
professors. [B] targeted medical students; promised the help of a ‘friend’ ([A]), who had other ‘friends’ 309 
at the university. The students paid them, or provided clinical work in [A]’s clinic. (Verdict, Trial A).   310 
The University was also influenced by a dominant elite of local politicians, freemasons and 311 
businessmen, who influenced the executive board and weakened the standards of academic rigour to 312 
facilitate the graduation of their sons and daughters. The clan liaised with this elite, hoping to 313 
exploit its relationships with professors and other professionals. Troy University had a pre-existing 314 
reputation for ‘cutting corners’ with the admission and the graduation of students for the ‘children’ 315 
of the dominant elite. Hence, some professors were already directly connected with the mafia clan, 316 
and others had already accepted various forms of bribery from the dominant elite.  317 
Clan Leader [C] graduated at Troy Medical School and developed intense relationships with the political 318 
and industrial elite in Troy. These relationships were also exploited by his brother [D], for years a full 319 
professor at Troy University and an executive in a leading hospital (Antimafia Commission Report) 320 
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Troy University, thus, was not a heavily guarded professional system focused on ensuring rigour 321 
and transparency. Rather, administrators and professors had bent regulations and processes to their 322 
interests. At Troy University, therefore, the clan did not need to disrupt strong professional barriers, 323 
nor create a network of ‘bad professors’ from scratch. It could instead revise pre-existing academic 324 
practices and re-orient them toward a more ambitious plan of not just helping a few students “here 325 
and there”, but rather create a more structured commerce of exams and graduations.  326 
[Congressman E]: We must continue to investigate the relationships between the mafia and the deviated 327 
freemasons and politicians in Troy. The infiltration of Troy University was made possible by these 328 
preconditions. [Congressman F]: [Trial A] suggests that the infiltration of Troy University did not begin 329 
with this clan and has probably not ended with their arrest (Antimafia Commission, proceeding 1) 330 
The clan looked for a university with a sufficiently high reputation for the graduation of its 331 
affiliates. The clan did not infiltrate universities with a public reputation for being ‘too easy’ or 332 
‘corrupt’ because their graduates would be viewed with suspicion and not be employed by private 333 
and public Health Care organizations. The clan targeted Troy University because it had a good 334 
reputation and was the reference academic hub in the area. Rankings suggest that Troy is an above-335 
average provider, with good indicators related to medical training. Troy University has a number of 336 
nationally-known alumni and is located in an important city in Italy. Its medical graduates regularly 337 
find jobs in healthcare organizations in and outside the region. Hence, Troy was ‘above suspicion’. 338 
The region became lively economically and culturally due to its industrial and urban growth. The 339 
University provided specialized courses not available elsewhere, and established itself as the key 340 
education institution in the region (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 341 
RECRUITING AND COLLUDING WITH “PRE-DISPOSED” PROFESSORS 342 
Once the clan had established its presence in Troy, it began recruiting professors who had already 343 
collaborated with it or had signalled their availability to engage in misconduct. These individuals 344 
used the profession to achieve material goals, and asked for a quid pro quo. Hence, they were 345 
recruited through perverse mechanisms, i.e. financial and non-financial incentives (e.g. money, 346 
support in career progression, inclusion in elite networks, and help in other professional activities).  347 
Professor [M]’s support can be explained with: evidence of financial gains (confirmed by witnesses); 348 
escalating the University’s ranking thanks to the clan’s support; participating in drug trafficking, gaining 349 
additional money. (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 350 
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These professors did not just perform misconduct, i.e. manipulate the admission, marking and 351 
graduation of students; they also managed it, i.e. by identifying other corruptible peers, providing 352 
incentives and threats, infiltrating the administration to disrupt monitoring activities, and liaising 353 
with external stakeholders, e.g. healthcare professionals, politicians, businessmen, and freemasons.  354 
Professor [M] identified and threatened peers for the clan. Also [M] was employed the Dean’s Office 355 
where s/he prevented attempts to denounce threats and monitor exams; and ostentatiously paraded her 356 
friendship with clan members. The clan was strategically interested in placing [M] at the centre of power 357 
in Troy; [M] exploited this support to fulfil personal interests (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 358 
Using the profession for personal benefits, these professors developed a close relationship with the 359 
clan. This relationship was reinforced by two additional mechanisms.  360 
First, the clan embedded the pre-disposed professors in their culture and practices. The clan 361 
established perverse psychological contracts with the ‘friendly’ professors, combining threats of 362 
repercussions against any betrayal with promises of rewards. The clan communicated its goals and 363 
practices to these professors, who incorporated and replicated them over time. The investigation 364 
revealed how these professors exchanged nicknames with the clan, appreciated their secret identity 365 
as mafia collaborators, and subordinated professional interests to criminal ones. The trusteeship 366 
norms aimed at the protection of students and society were subordinated to trusteeship norms 367 
towards the clan (considered a new “client” to serve or a new “leader” to follow). Rather than being 368 
victims of the clan, these professors participated in its functioning and reinforced its practices. 369 
Professor [M] developed a strong relationship with current and former students close to the clan. He took 370 
advantage of these relationships receiving money or professional favours in his clinic. The relationship 371 
became so intimate that clan members used humorous nicknames to refer to him. [M] exploited this aura 372 
of danger to intimidate peers, and mimic mafioso behaviours (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 373 
Another implication was that these professors perversely denied the legitimacy of the victims and 374 
denied the injuries perpetrated to students and society. The misconduct victimized: (i) honest 375 
students, who devoted more effort to study, performed better in exams, but were ultimately denied a 376 
competitive advantage over the others; (ii) citizens who were exposed to incompetent healthcare 377 
providers. Consistently with the mafia culture, these professors regarded honest individuals as 378 
“simpletons” who were not smart or brave enough to participate in the misconduct themselves.  379 
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Second, the clan subjected the pre-disposed professors to its direct chain of command. As these 380 
professors co-designed and participated in the misconduct strategy, they also became a potential 381 
source of threats. The clan implemented pervasive, obtrusive controls to regulate professors’ 382 
behaviours and prevent any betrayals. The professors were surrounded by clan members that issued 383 
orders, controlled their behaviours and implemented punishments. Professors who did not abide by 384 
these rules would be punished ‘through blood’ within the community. Keenly aware of the 385 
repercussions, the professors did not even conceive the possibility of betraying the clan.  386 
Once the requests of misconduct had escalated, Professor [G] became reluctant to continue her 387 
relationship with Professor [M] and with the clan. S/he was pulled back into the clan, however, by 388 
allusive threats. Her car, for instance, was stolen and “by chance” found by a young clan member in a 389 
graveyard, with a note saying that “next time, it won’t be just the car” (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 390 
Being engaged in other illegal activities, these professors could not pull back from their 391 
commitment. The clan threatened they would lose everything, and be disbarred from the profession, 392 
so that they had to share responsibilities for the misconduct. 393 
The clan intentionally engaged professors in drugs and weapons trafficking, thus strengthening the 394 
bonds. It threatened professors with revealing their engagement if things went wrong. If that happened, 395 
their professional careers would be ruined (Verdict, Trial A) 396 
RECRUITING AND CONTROLLING NON-DISPOSED PROFESSORS 397 
Only few professors colluded with the clan, so their recruitment was insufficient to support the 398 
masterplan. Students asked for help in passing exams that were controlled by professors with no 399 
disposition to, or experience with, misconduct. To recruit this cadre of professors, the clan adopted 400 
five different initiatives. First, the clan intermediaries identified a selected group of professors. The 401 
clan did not engage every professor at Troy University since the risks of over-recruiting outweighed 402 
its benefits. Clan members excluded “incorruptible” professors who (i) refused incentives and 403 
threats, and reported them to police; and (ii) were connected with anti-mafia groups or law-404 
enforcement agencies, and thus had greater chances of receiving protection. The clan would need to 405 
fight these individuals physically, thus risking over-exposure of its presence in the University. To 406 
avoid this, it was not inconceivable for the clan to ask students to pass exams on their own account. 407 
During a wiretapped conversation, a student complained to Member [H – also a doctor] about the refusal 408 
of Professor [I]. [H] refused to retaliate against [I] arguing that this would escalate beyond tolerable 409 
16 
 
levels: “[It] is not reasonable. He’s a real a***ole, who can screw you in front of everybody. If I act, I 410 
will hurt her, but this could create a media storm. Let’s stay quiet for a while (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 411 
Similarly, the clan did not recruit professors who managed easy or low-credit modules. Again, the 412 
benefits were not worth the risks of over-exposure. A network of advisers (consisting of ‘friendly’ 413 
professors and students) surveyed the modules and identified core exams that had to be controlled 414 
for their importance or difficulty; and an array of professors who could be ‘safely’ captured. The 415 
clan then (i) directed its students toward ‘safe’ destinations (e.g. Surgery and Dentistry); (ii) 416 
recruited the relevant professors first with allusive threats, such as “you know who we are” – and 417 
only subsequently with more aggressive approaches; and (iii) sometimes rejected students’ demands 418 
when they were not confident they could control the professors.  419 
Doctor [N], a clinical lead in a district hospital was sure s/he could recruit ‘her’ professors with “certain 420 
outcomes”. “I can guarantee you it is a certainty… I told Affiliate [Q] to reach Professor [P] for this 421 
favour. [Q] knows how to keep [P] quiet and [P] knows what to do” (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 422 
Second, the clan recruited professors through threats mixed with incentives. Threats were necessary 423 
to push the reluctant professors toward misconduct; the incentives bound the professor to the clan. 424 
Accepting the bribe meant that professors were co-responsible for the misconduct, and thus could 425 
not deny their responsibility. The incentives took the form of financial, career or networking 426 
rewards. The clan appeared especially keen to exploit the interests of these professors as medical 427 
practitioners, in order to increase its presence in the medical field. High-status professors in the 428 
Medical School were also medical practitioners in public hospitals or private clinics. As some 429 
struggled to attract clients or sustain the costs, the clan proposed financial resources to buy new 430 
technologies, or ‘free personnel’ in clinics. Some professors accepted the favour, assessing that 431 
'small' favours in higher education could generate large benefits in healthcare.  432 
Professor [R] had financial problems that led him to ask for loans. The clan exploited this weakness, 433 
furnishing the loan with a ‘reasonable’ interest rate. Instead of resorting to traditional loan-shark 434 
techniques, the clan asked for ‘favours’ in her tenure as professor and doctor (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A). 435 
Professors who refused these offers were threatened through physical extortion and psychological 436 
intimidation. The investigations report how clan members threatened professors first with 437 
psychological threats, and gradually escalated with small bombs, gunshots, and actual physical 438 
injury. As the cliché suggests, therefore, the clan made offers that professors could not refuse. 439 
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Professors eventually became familiar with the mafia method, and accepted the incentives and 440 
misconduct to avoid the threats. Consequently, through intimidation the clan invaded professors’ 441 
autonomy and controlled their decision-making without much need to escalate its intimidations.  442 
Key examples of clan intimidation: (i) Professor [G] found an unknown individual in her office, who 443 
promoted the case of a ‘friend’ in allusive terms; (ii) Professor [S] was shot outside the faculty; (iii) 444 
small bombs exploded outside exam rooms; (iv) gunshots were fired outside [T]’s home (Verdict, Trial A) 445 
Third, the clan infiltrated students and used the pre-disposed professors to control the reluctant 446 
professors. Reluctant professors represented an even higher risk of betrayal than the pre-disposed 447 
ones. To minimize this risk, these professors were also constantly monitored by the clan. Instead of 448 
using its direct chain of command, the clan infiltrated lower-status members into the University, i.e. 449 
(i) students benefitting from misconduct, (ii) corrupted professors; and (iii) additional clan members 450 
acting as “parents”, “boyfriends”, “uncles” or “dear friends” and “showing up almost daily” in the 451 
corridors or during the exams. The “constant sense of being monitored” by “arrogant and 452 
intimidating people who had no reason to be there” generated a pervasive “intolerable climate of 453 
oppression” (Professor L, Verdict, Trial A). On top of this, the clan also used external stakeholders 454 
(e.g. businessmen, suppliers, politicians, freemasons) gravitating around the university. These clan 455 
intermediaries used a combination of peer pressure, situational influence and administrative control 456 
to guide professors’ behaviours. The corrupted professors used their experience and peer influence 457 
to entice the reluctant professors, observe their behaviours from the inside, and exert peer pressure.  458 
Professor [M] threatened peers and paraded his friendship with well-known clan members. [M] 459 
intimidated key people in the Dean’s Office to be allowed to join their meetings. Once there, he behaved 460 
aggressively, demanding favours in exchange for his support for the Dean’s re-election. [M[alluded to 461 
clan interventions to have these requests satisfied (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 462 
Differently, students contributed to a more situational influence on professors. These students had 463 
free access to university spaces, so they could observe professors’ behaviours daily, and impart 464 
“punishments” and “warnings”. The clan infiltrated its students in various departments of the 465 
university, so they could put pressure professors. These students also intimidated peers, secretaries 466 
and administrators, gradually gaining their (often grudging) support or silence. Students’ pressures 467 
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were manifested through small, but eloquent gestures – enough to create a climate of oppression 468 
and showcase the presence of the clan, but not sufficient to over-expose themselves and the clan.  469 
Professor [L] reported that [four students] usually remained in the Faculty during the exam period. 470 
Student [O] particularly spent a lot of time ‘promoting’ the cause of other students… There was a 471 
common pattern: a student (or ‘friend’) first demanded ‘favours’ politely, then allusively, and finally 472 
aggressively. At that point, another student or ‘friend’ joined the former, calming things down and 473 
suggesting that “if things get resolved”, everybody will be alright (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 474 
The influence of corrupted professors and menacing students ran deep in the administrative system 475 
of the University. The clan put the ‘right men in the right places’ to (i) prevent complaints from 476 
reaching police forces and (ii) inhibit the creation of better monitoring systems. The clan helped the 477 
election of a ‘friendly’ professor as new Dean; in exchange, s/he included relevant clan supporters 478 
and affiliates in the Dean’s Office and turned a ‘blind eye’ to the infiltration. For instance, some 479 
professors reported to their line managers that they had received threats from “students”; these 480 
complaints were ignored, however, and never submitted to the academic boards and to the police.  481 
Professor [L] had reported several threats that s/he had received, but no action was taken by Professor 482 
(line manager) [S] and the Dean, who refused to forward the complaints to the police. The university 483 
administration worked against her demands, as there was a generalized tendency to minimize any 484 
intimidation, for fears of retaliations, to preserve the “good name” of the University, but also because of 485 
the lack of individuals willing to report and manage the complaints (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 486 
Honest professors were isolated from key roles in the university. Professor L was ostracized 487 
because of her stubbornness; an admission panel was threatened by Professor M to “mind its own 488 
business” when it tried to exclude an inappropriate student. The infiltration of key university bodies 489 
ran so deep that clan members openly manifested their presence in academic meetings.  490 
Professor [P] reported the irregular presence of clan members in the Dean’s Office: “They regularly 491 
walked in and out of the rooms with confidence and even offered me coffee”. Professor [Q] added that, 492 
with the new Dean, s/he saw [bad apples] swaggering around his office (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 493 
The clan transformed Troy University into a closed system, deflecting the attentions and support of 494 
regulators and external parties. Hence, professors – while often disinclined to participate in the 495 
misconduct – found few alternatives to it, as they feared for their lives and for their academic 496 
careers. Clan supporters also prospered outside the university. These professors were given more 497 
responsibilities in key processes and liaised with stakeholders gravitating outside the university.  498 
Clan control extended to its constant presence in the main elective bodies; to deep relationships with the 499 
administrative staff; to hegemony in the Student Union. Here they successfully prevented any control or 500 
any improvement of the monitoring system (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 501 
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Fourth, the clan exploited weaknesses in the peer review system. Professors could have spotted 502 
irregularities in others’ marking and graduation practices, and formed a united front to fight against 503 
the clan infiltration. Notably, several professors acknowledged an “intolerable climate of 504 
intimidation” in the university, and sometimes discussed this privately. However, there is no 505 
evidence that professors allied to confront this problem. In part, this was due to the presence of the 506 
clan in key structures and processes. Hence, professors did not have free spaces where they could 507 
plan a defensive strategy without the intrusion of clan supporters. In part, professors had a pervasive 508 
reluctance to “stick their noses into others’ affairs” which was informed by their professional 509 
autonomy. While investigations did not pay extensive attention to this aspect – as it did not violate 510 
laws – several commentators argued that even “honest” professors had been slow to monitor others’ 511 
behaviours; as well as reluctant to allow external, impartial, parties monitor their own behaviours.  512 
Any attempt to denounce misconduct in Troy was always rejected as non-scientific. Professors would 513 
discuss their problems only with their peers, and refuse to answer our questions. We asked about bombs 514 
and blood, arguing that “keeping the peace and quiet” could have killed any of them. And yet, professors 515 
argued that the accusations were not scientific, and thus worthless (Journalist, Newspaper extract) 516 
The clan could exploit the fact that professors already worked in disciplinary siloes and did not 517 
intrude in the jurisdictions of their peers. On the one hand, it captured the professors individually, 518 
without threatening the entire social network of peers gravitating around an exam. The clan 519 
handpicked the recruited professors and peers, who may have sensed the presence of a mafia clan, 520 
but did not have enough elements to denounce the specific corruptors and corrupted individuals. 521 
Our evidence shows that professors were captured individually. [Colluding professors, students or 522 
stakeholders] got close to the professor, asked him/her to take care personally about that favour, unless 523 
his/her peers were not already colluding with the clan (Verdict, Trial A) 524 
Notably, professors never reported their suspicion that one of their peers was engaged in 525 
misconduct, unless s/he personally threatened them.  526 
Fifth, the clan did not intrude in other core professional jurisdictions. The clan avoided areas of 527 
professional work that professors might have protected more jealously. The investigations did not 528 
provide any proof that the clan tried to control, for instance, any areas of research and teaching. The 529 
clan did not need them as controlling the assessment and admission of students sufficed.  530 
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Our investigations found evidence that the ‘system’ regarded only the passing of specific exams, the 531 
admission of otherwise inadmissible students, and the support of their specialization. For other areas of 532 
professors’ work, there is no evidence of any clan interference (Verdict, Trial A) 533 
This was a sensible choice because teaching curricula were strongly protected against radical 534 
changes in the past. The Medical School experienced examples of professional resistance, even 535 
during the clan infiltration. New content on abortion and end-of-life pathways, for instance, were 536 
met with hostility by conservative professors, who actively campaigned against these innovations 537 
and openly intruded in peers’ jurisdictions. By comparison, professors raised very little resistance 538 
against the growing perception of misconduct in the University.  539 
PROTRACTING AND PROTECTING THE RECRUITMENT FOR 30 YEARS 540 
The “University of Exams” lasted for almost 30 years – a long period of misconduct that was 541 
seldom punctuated by violent actions. The clan did not need to constantly adopt aggressive 542 
behaviours to exert its control over the recruited professors, and to continue recruit new professors 543 
in Troy University. Rather, it used a combination of four perverse and pervasive initiatives to 544 
protect the recruited professionals from external investigations and internal defections; and continue 545 
recruit new professors. Two actions were already presented above, i.e. the pervasive infiltration of 546 
governing bodies and social influences within the university, and the perverse exploitation of 547 
professional autonomy. These mechanisms supported the recruitment of professors, but also served 548 
the purpose of “normalizing” the misconduct by protecting them from sanctions. For the sake of 549 
brevity, we focus here on only two additional features. 550 
First, the clan exploited the ‘code of silence’ entrenched in mafia victims. The investigations 551 
exploited the pervasive fear of mafia retaliations underlying professors’ and students’ omertá. The 552 
clan did not need constantly to threaten honest individuals because these were all aware of the mafia 553 
method, and remained silent fearing even worse consequences. Professors and students made sure 554 
that they did not know too much, not to expose themselves to additional risks. It was sufficient for 555 
the clan to perform small gestures to communicate its presence and preserve the status quo.  556 
The clan used its power to generate a scenario of omertá and subjugation. This climate was characterized 557 
by a looming menace which did not need to be made explicit with grand gestures. The victim already 558 
knew the consequences of refusals (Verdict, Trial A)  559 
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Second, the clan gained the indirect support of students and external stakeholders. The clan 560 
provided perverse incentives to students and external stakeholders, who thus had reasons not to 561 
report their suspicions. Students suspected dubious marking practices as they noticed the ‘small 562 
gestures’ of the clan with professors and peers. They remained silent, fearing retaliation and 563 
recognizing that they were not massively inconvenienced by the status quo. The clan ensured that 564 
their protégées did not acquire 'too high' grades, and attract the hostility of other students. The clan 565 
was worried that the gap between marks and skills could be so transparently wide that students 566 
would complain about it. The clan expected its protégées to be “good enough” rather than the best 567 
in the class; and sanctioned situations where professors were too generous or students went too far. 568 
Three students ranked well above the rest of the class. Clan intermediaries became very concerned that 569 
this could attract too much attention: “We’ve made a mess!” They had instructed two students to copy all 570 
the right answers, but the instruction was wrong. While the excellent result of one individual could be 571 
normal, three individuals with scores well above the others raised suspicions (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 572 
Several students contemplated the perverse benefits of the “University of Exams”, and moved to 573 
Troy to take easier exams. These students knew they could graduate rapidly, and exploit the status 574 
quo. Troy experienced a phenomenon of ‘adverse selection’ because talented students moved away 575 
from Troy and were replaced by those who had failed elsewhere. Regular students also had no 576 
compelling reason to denounce misconduct, as it could delegitimize their grades and because the 577 
inflation of grades was convenient. As students’ careers could be complicated by a scandal in their 578 
university, they were not incentivized to denounce cases of professional misconduct.  579 
Besides these considerations, the clan reinforced its pre-existing ties with the ‘dominant elite’ by 580 
exchanging the support and silence of external stakeholders (politicians, businessmen, healthcare 581 
organizations) with favours. Political groups, for instance, exploited professors’ pork barrelling to 582 
gain additional votes for the elections. Likewise, healthcare organizations and businesses exploited 583 
university contracts and other financial incentives. Because Troy University was the key provider of 584 
professional education, it possessed resources (e.g. access to grants) and influence (e.g. pork 585 
barrelling) that incentivized stakeholders not to monitor and prevent misconduct.  586 
Clan influence expanded into local politics and business. The relations between Member [W] and 587 
Politician [Y] are certain. [Y] informed [W] that a government role was available and they should “talk 588 
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about it. [W] argued: “we have thousands of votes” from professors’ pork barrelling. Doctor [T] 589 
revealed that the clan provided jobs in companies working for the university (Verdict, Trial A) 590 
DISCUSSION 591 
Our case study investigated how an external agent recruited professionals into its misconduct 592 
project. Most research has focused on the enablers of misconduct as perceived and performed by 593 
professionals (Gunz and Gunz, 2007; Kosmala and Herrback, 2006; Morris and Moore, 2000; 594 
Sikka, 2009). Few studies took the perspective of the external agents penetrating organizational 595 
boundaries and steering professionals’ behaviours toward misconduct (Muzio et al., 2016; Palmer, 596 
2012). These studies present an important gap in our understanding of professional misconduct, i.e. 597 
they overlook the interplay of perverse and pervasive mechanisms when external agents recruit 598 
professionals in their misconduct project. In these studies, professionals are recruitment primarily 599 
through perverse mechanisms, such as incentives and threats (Moynihan and Cassels, 2008). 600 
Studies on pervasive mechanisms instead explain the broader contamination of institutional 601 
contexts and professional associations (Jaraush, 1990). To instead investigate the interplay between 602 
perverse and pervasive mechanisms, our study focused on an ‘abnormal’ misconduct project (i.e. 603 
corrupted exam marking) designed by ‘abhorrent’ social agents (i.e. a clan), and mostly executed by 604 
‘normal’, reluctant, professionals. Our findings reveal that the capacity of the external agent to 605 
recruit these professionals could not be explained simply with the use of incentives. Rather, the 606 
external agent: (i) infiltrated the professional system to implement perverse interventions and 607 
control pervasive processes; and (ii) used a stepped approach to normalize the misconduct. These 608 
findings represent our main contributions, and will be discussed in the following sections.  609 
Infiltrating pervasive professional processes with a Trojan horse for perverse reasons  610 
Past research suggests that professionals mostly enact misconduct as a deviant behaviour because of 611 
perverse mechanisms; or, alternatively, as a normal behaviour because of pervasive mechanisms 612 
(Palmer, 2012). Diversely, the mafia clan studied here strategically combined perverse and 613 
pervasive mechanisms to recruit and control professionals in a misconduct project. This is 614 
somewhat surprising, as the lack of control over organizational and professional processes of the 615 
23 
 
mafia clan may suggest a primary, if not exclusive, focus on perverse antecedents, e.g. incentives 616 
and threats. Contrary to this hypothesis, however, the mafia clan was capable of nesting pervasive 617 
mechanisms into perverse ones to achieve superior outcomes. For instance, while the mafia clan 618 
used incentives and threats to unsettle single professionals, it used a broader socio-administrative 619 
system (e.g. consisting of affiliated students, corrupted professors, deviated Dean’s Office and 620 
external stakeholders) to exert constant pressure on several professionals at once. The activation of 621 
both perverse and pervasive mechanisms allowed the mafia clan to reach individual professionals, 622 
and customize its influence on their specific needs and/or fears. Our findings  highlight a stark 623 
dichotomy between interventions targeting pre-disposed professionals (mostly grounded on 624 
incentives, hierarchical control, co-participation in the strategy) and those targeting reluctant 625 
professionals (mostly grounded on threats, and internal controls from pervasive mechanisms). 626 
This result furnishes insights into how external agents penetrate organizational practices that are 627 
otherwise jealously protected by professionals. Rather than attempting to disrupt and revise these 628 
practices, which likely engender strong resistance from professionals (Currie et al., 2012; 629 
Llewellyn, 2001), external agents may find professional environments where organizational 630 
practices have been weakened by professionals pre-disposed to misconduct, and exploit the 631 
presence of these actors to import their misconduct project. In our study, the external agents 632 
infiltrated the organization to first import their project from outside and then normalize it from the 633 
inside. The infiltration strategy blurred the line between perverse and pervasive mechanisms, since 634 
the abnormal incentives and threats were channelled by ‘normal’ professional structures and actors 635 
(e.g. students, Dean’s Office, professional peers).  636 
We thus suggest that the infiltration of professional structures supported a perverse and intentional 637 
use of pervasive mechanisms to recruit professionals in a misconduct project. This is different from 638 
what has been previously reported by the literature, according to which pervasive mechanisms tend 639 
to create misconduct unintentionally, e.g. obtuse controls and inefficient communication systems 640 
might aim to ‘do good’, but backfire (Gabbioneta et al., 2014; McGivern and Ferlie, 2007; Palmer, 641 
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2012). In these circumstances, professionals replicate misconduct over time without complaining, 642 
because they take cues from superiors, peers, clients and guidelines, and do not perceive their 643 
behaviour as misconduct. In our case study, the external agent achieved a similarly pervasive effect 644 
(i.e. professionals replicated misconduct without complaining) despite the fact that professionals 645 
were keenly aware of the abnormal nature of their misconduct. This is because, while incentives 646 
and threats motivated the misconduct, the control of pervasive processes (e.g. peer pressure, 647 
situational influences, governing bodies) pre-empted the capacity of the reluctant professionals to 648 
fight back. Particularly, the reluctant professors had no space where they could safely isolate 649 
themselves from the agents of misconduct, and where they could form a united front against them.  650 
In order to strategically combine perverse and pervasive mechanisms, the external agents needed to 651 
build a Trojan horse. We labelled the case as ‘Troy’ to resonate with the Iliad, and convey the 652 
notion that external agents had to infiltrate the organization. Unlike the Iliad, however, the mafia 653 
clan in our case study did not just use ‘soldiers’ from their own camp (e.g. clan members), but 654 
populated the ‘belly’ of the horse with insiders (i.e. pre-disposed students, and administrators) who 655 
knew the profession and/or the organization from the inside. The role of the pre-disposed professors 656 
was especially important. External agents typically lack legitimacy and expertise to move freely in 657 
the professional organization, so they need individuals that can provide these resources on their 658 
behalf. The pre-disposed professionals were necessary to have: (i) internal knowledge brokers, who 659 
understood professionals dynamics and knew who could be corrupted and how to hide the 660 
misconduct; (ii) internal carriers of misconduct, who exerted an administrative and social influence 661 
on others; and (iii) a linchpin between the interests and goals of the external agent and the practice 662 
and norms of the profession. These professors were recruited by the mafia clan through perverse 663 
mechanisms, but also co-designed and implemented recruitment initiatives targeting individual 664 
peers and infiltrating the governing bodies – which could have been out-of-reach, expensive or 665 
risky for the external agent. The importance of the pre-disposed professionals as linchpins between 666 
‘abhorrent’ external agents and ‘normal’ professionals resonates with earlier studies on 667 
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organizational change and professional resistance. Past studies noted that regulators and managers 668 
struggle to orient professionals toward new practices, and need to engage hybrid managers acting as 669 
‘two-way windows’ and translating their strategy to professionals (Burgess et al., 2015; Llewellyn, 670 
2001). Very similarly, the pre-disposed professors acted as ‘two-way windows’ as they embraced 671 
the logics and interests of the external agents and knew the norms and practices of the profession.  672 
Exploiting ‘normal’ professional features for ‘abnormal’ recruitments 673 
Past studies have highlighted that processes of professional change initiated by external agents are 674 
often triggered by a precipitating jolt and then unfold slowly, as non-professional agents may need 675 
to exploit precipitating jolts (e.g. the death of patient, financial scandals) and still need to implement 676 
incremental interventions with the help of professionals (Greenwood et al., 2002; Reay et al., 2006). 677 
The proponents of these changes tried to evolve organizational practices toward ‘better conduct’ or 678 
remained neutral about the ethical implications (Greenwood et al., 2002; Kellogg, 2009; Muzio et 679 
al., 2013). Relatively little is instead known about processes of professional change where ‘good 680 
conduct’ is meant to deteriorate. Shedding a light on the latter, our case study described a process of 681 
change that was not activated by any visible and “abnormal” event, and at the same time was 682 
relatively rapid. Misconduct projects, unlike positive professionalization projects, aim to go 683 
unnoticed and thus seek the ‘silence’ of externally not visible and rapid changes. To achieve this, 684 
our findings suggest the importance of organizational affordances (i.e. contradictions and 685 
ambiguities in professional conduct that pre-existed the recruitment strategy). The misconduct 686 
project was pursued in a weakened professional context, where existing arrangements already 687 
legitimized imperfect exam marking exercises, and where some individuals had already liaised with 688 
external agents. The identification of a flawed professional context was the first stage of a stepped 689 
approach that, however, did not exploit precipitating jolts or the emergence of new players (as in 690 
Greenwood et al., 2002), but on the contrary a stable professional environment where incumbent 691 
players were already afforded some degree of misconduct. The mafia clan built on these 692 
weaknesses to expand the diffusion and depth of the misconduct. These findings resonate with 693 
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earlier research on ‘organizational affordances’ (van Dijk et al., 2011; Radaelli et al., 2017) which 694 
argued that innovations and changes are more likely to emerge in professional contexts with 695 
unresolved contradictions and ambiguities. Professionals, in these contexts, need to make sense of 696 
the ambiguities and solve the contradictions; thus they are more inclined to change their practices. 697 
Likewise, with misconduct, professionals need to make sense of different interests and logics that 698 
coexist in their environment. They may thus be more inclined to deviate from norms. 699 
We suggest that ‘organizational affordances’ are not necessarily perverse and extraordinary features 700 
of professional organizations; they may be pervasive and ‘normal’. Our case suggests that 701 
professional work possesses three main forces – i.e. autonomy, multiple embeddedness, and 702 
trusteeship – that are originally meant to protect the professions from misconduct but 703 
simultaneously supported contradictory goals (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). First, autonomy is 704 
expected to protect professionals from external influences, and yet at Troy University it had 705 
pervasive effects on misconduct. The mafia clan did not disrupt practices of professional autonomy 706 
because they guaranteed its ‘opaque quality’ against peer reviews and external monitoring; hence 707 
misconduct could be hidden and justified more easily. Furthermore, the clan exploited the fact that 708 
professionals were already respectful of peers’ autonomy and did not monitor their conduct. 709 
Professional autonomy was not even revised, but exploited and ramped up with administrative and 710 
social systems that further discouraged collaborations and mutual control. Second, professionals are 711 
naturally embedded in multiple environments, which in theory impart greater quality to their 712 
services. Professors, for instance, are expected to navigate other professional and industrial 713 
environments to increase the relevance of their teaching and practice. This multiple embeddedness 714 
may have pervasive effects on misconduct once professionals negotiate their work and its outcome 715 
with other professions or interest groups (McGivern and Ferlie, 2007; Muzio et al., 2016). Medicine 716 
professors, in particular, are likely to work in the healthcare field; to negotiate resources with 717 
multiple suppliers for their teaching and clinics; to attract the interests of politics and business – and 718 
so on. It follows that professionals (i) are intrinsically exposed to multiple professional interests and 719 
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non-professional ‘temptations’ and (ii) almost inevitably serve multiple clients (e.g. students, 720 
patients, industries, citizens). The contradiction between the norms of the multiple contexts in 721 
which professionals are embedded can be exploited by external agents to make the notion of ‘good 722 
conduct’ more fluid, and gradually engender misconduct. For instance, by exchanging misconduct 723 
with improvements in clinical work, professionals ‘balanced the ledger’ between the interests of 724 
patients with those of students. Finally, professionals’ trusteeship norms may have pervasive effects 725 
on misconduct, which contradict the intended benefits on clients. Trusteeship norms prioritize 726 
clients’ interest over self-interest, and thus are meant to prevent misconduct (Von Nordenflycht, 727 
2010). However, pursuing the interests of clients “too much” may backfire and generate negative 728 
outcomes. Our study highlights that professionals pursued the interests of some of their clients (e.g. 729 
patients) at the expense of others (e.g. students and taxpayers). External agents may exploit the 730 
‘grey area’ between different trusteeship norms to normalize misconduct with ad-hoc incentives.  731 
CONCLUSIONS 732 
This study has investigated how an external agent recruited professionals in its misconduct project. 733 
Our findings highlighted the possibility to infiltrate professional and organizational boundaries 734 
using a combination of perverse and pervasive mechanisms. Professional organizations may host 735 
individuals that are pre-disposed to misconduct. External agents can exploit their expertise and 736 
status to co-design a misconduct project. Thanks to their mediation, external agents may become 737 
able to ‘handpick’ and control professionals that are otherwise reluctant to enact misconduct.  738 
Further research can build on our contribution. In our case, an illegal external agent (i.e. a mafia 739 
clan) successfully recruited professional actors (i.e. professors) and influenced their work to pursue 740 
a misconduct project. Future research could extend our findings by exploring additional scenarios. 741 
First: what happens when external agents are legal organizations using permissible incentives to 742 
pursue their private agendas (e.g. companies providing universities with on-field projects or 743 
professional opportunities)? How professional actors manage, or mismanage, the challenge of 744 
gaining external benefits while preserving good conduct represents a fertile area for future 745 
28 
 
contributions. Second: what can professional organizations do to prevent or react to the infiltration 746 
of illegal organizations? Our case represented a success from the point of view of the mafia clan. 747 
Other studies may conversely elaborate theories on how professionals identify external threats and 748 
protect themselves. Third: do external agents change when they develop partnerships with 749 
professionals? Our study focused on the external agents’ bad influence on professional actors. 750 
Future research may highlight if and how professional actors may in turn influence the work and 751 
goals of external agents. Fourth: do external agents use other approaches to infiltrate or exploit 752 
professional actors? Particularly, future research could explore if and how external agents might 753 
pursue their private agendas by exploiting professionals’ good conduct, rather than deviate it. 754 
To conclude, we want to highlight some considerations on our methodology. We relied closely on 755 
secondary sources, most of which were collected by actors (e.g. law-enforcement agencies) for non-756 
research purposes. Key informants were inaccessible for primary data collection, and this is indeed 757 
typical of several instances of professional misconduct and illicit activities. We believe that the use 758 
of secondary sources is vital for increasing the number and quality of studies on these elusive 759 
topics, as we could analyse data that we could not have collected on our own (e.g. insights into the 760 
criminal activities obtained directly from wiretapped conversations). By navigating this trade-off, 761 
we believe that the literature on professional misconduct could gain access to vital, and yet 762 
otherwise inaccessible, phenomena. 763 
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Table 1: Data Sources 
Note: S.C.Cassation = Supreme Court of Cassation; DIA = Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate; DNA = Anti-Mafia National Directorate  
Trial Judicial Document Authors Year Purpose of Document Pages 
A  Arrest Warrant #1 Court X 2000 Alleged clan affiliates and members are sent to trial for illegal 
activities at Troy University 
200+  
Arrest Warrant #2 Court Y 2001 50+  
Verdict of full trial 
 
Court X 2005 Document describes infiltration of Troy University and explains 
reasons for conviction 
350+  
B  Verdict of full trial Court Z 2011 Documents provide data on the strategy of the mafia clan (and related 
organization) to infiltrate business and public administration. 
Documents represent the three degrees of law. 
2000+  
Verdict of appeal trial Court U 2014 800+  
Verdict of last resort trial S.C. Cassation 2015 5+  
Additional data on Mafia Clan 
Newspaper articles, documentary transcripts, reportages Various 2000-
2015 
External reports, interviews, and narratives related to the ‘ndrangheta 
infiltration of professional fields 
150+  
 
Additional data on Troy University  
Books B1 Anonymized 1976 It describes the social and political context of the Troy area in the 
mid-70s 
240+  
Books B2 Anonymized 2010 It describes social and political context of the Troy area in  220+  
Books B3 Anonymized 2010 It describes the links between Mafia phenomena and social class 350+  
Additional data on Mafia activities and infiltration of Public Administration 
Parliament Report on Organized Crime and Mafia 
Parliament Anti-
Mafia commission 
2000 Research documents on infiltration phenomena.  Include analyses of 
cases, and background information 
200+ 
Parliament Report on Organized Crime and Mafia 2008 150+ 
Parliament Report on Organized Crime and Mafia 2015 150+  
6-month Report on Mafia DIA. 2011 Report on Mafia-related phenomena.  Includes analyses of cases, and 
background information 
350+ 
Annual Report on Mafia and Terrorism DNA. 2013 900+  
Prefectural Decree Anonymized  2005 Document on infiltration of healthcare and professional bodies 150+  
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Table 2: Data Coding Process   
(Additional) Exemplary Quotes Recruiting Theme Dimension 
Clan leaders have long sent their children to hang out with professionals’ children, and eventually marry them. They send them 
to the best universities to manage business professionally without a criminal record (Judge Alfa, Newspaper interview 1) 
Witness [Alpha], former clan member and student of Troy University, noted that the Student Union was already a warehouse 
for clans’ weapons. This was common knowledge among students (Arrest Warrant, Trial A) 
Pre-existing 
relationships with 
professionals 
Selecting 
‘appropriate’ 
context 
From the seventies onwards, Troy experienced the establishment of [the elite] influencing the labour market to consolidate its 
power. The elite developed a network of favours aimed at replicating the system of power over time. In this overall scheme, it 
was crucial that the ‘children’ of the elite would graduate at Troy, possibly with honours (Book B1, Excerpt) 
Weakened 
university 
arrangements 
The University provided modules that were not available elsewhere, so it appealed to students from several other regions. It 
was not unusual for Troy to receive applications from students well beyond its natural ‘catchment area’. The clan exploited this 
heterogeneity to mingle its own students (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 
Troy as legitimate 
professional 
provider 
Professor [M] explicitly mentioned that Professor [R] could reach any department for misconduct, to repay the clan for money 
s/he had been loaned  (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 
Professor [Z] and her assistant [AA] colluded with clan members to support the case of student [BB]. The investigation 
revealed a large number of phone calls among the individuals, indicating reciprocal trust and friendship. Professor [Z] had 
collaborated intensely with the clan to gain favours that went beyond money (Arrest Warrant 2, Trial A) 
Recruiting 
professors with 
incentives 
Recruiting 
pre-disposed 
professionals 
Professor M aggressively ordered administrators to “mind their own business” on the admission exams as s/he had interests to 
defend. When removed from the Dean’s Office s/he threatened the intervention of the clan (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 
Colluding professors applied pressure on peers, replicating the approach they had learned from clan members. First they 
approached the colleagues, and invited them to be more generous in marking. If colleagues resisted, the colluding professors 
would allude to their ‘friendship’ with the clan, or directly threaten them. (Verdict, Trial A) 
Embedding 
professors in clan 
culture and 
practice 
Phone call records indicate an unusual number of calls from [clan members] to Professor Z which reveal how often the former 
asked for clarifications and updates from the latter  (Arrest Warrant 2, Trial A) 
Monitoring 
professors through 
chain of command 
Some professors resisted the clan’s intimidation attempts. The clan often escalated its threats to physical violence [e.g. 
murdering a professor]. Sometimes, however, the clan “let them go” and focused on alternative options, easier to “capture” 
(Verdict, Trial A) 
Identifying a 
selected group of 
professors 
Recruiting 
reluctant 
professionals 
The incentives provided by the clan intermediaries were often paradoxical. They would protect professors from external threats 
which their own clan had created. This protection would materialize only in exchange of favours.  (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 
Incentives and 
threats 
Situational Influence: In one case, for instance, a number of old people attended an exam. Hiding behind newspapers, they 
monitored the exam, and left only when reassured that their student had passed the exam (Arrest Warrant, Trial A) 
It cannot be demonstrated that Assistant [AA] enacted her misconduct to gain personal rewards from the clan, as it arguably 
accommodated professional (rather than criminal) pressures from her superior (Arrest Warrant 2, Trial A)  
Controlling 
professors with 
infiltrated students, 
pre-disposed 
professors, and 
stakeholders 
Peer Pressure: The colluding professors infiltrated key governance bodies, where they liaised with peers and administrators, 
either by building new alliances or intimidating them. The same activities applied at student level, where colluding students 
similarly used panels (e.g. from Student Union) to recruit peers and intimidate them (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A)  
Administrative control:  Afraid of the real danger of [clan’s] threats, the commission panel agreed to help the young students. 
It is notable, in this regard, how Professor [E] was excluded by the panel because s/he was regarded harder to convince (Arrest 
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Warrant, Trial A) 
The [Head of Department] had promoted a new system whereby students would be tutored by one professor, and assessed by a 
panel of others. This provoked much resistance from the community. Professors had not been able to reach an agreement, so 
[the Head of department] tried to impose her solution to modernize the school (Professor Alpha, TV interview*) 
Exploiting weak 
peer review system 
[Commemorating the Head of Department] Her main accomplishment was her research [on advanced surgery techniques] that 
had gained national prominence. There was some initial disagreement on this research stream, but eventually s/he developed 
the evidence that now is used at national level  (Professor Alpha, TV interview*) 
Preserving core 
jurisdictions 
Witness [Beta] reported that “eventually, the clan controlled the activities of the University, and particular of the Medical 
School and its related Hospital. This business was organized by the clan, but managed by [a list of 12 names, combination of 
clan members, colluding professors, healthcare professionals liaising with professors]. They used their influence and that 
projected by the clan. (Verdict, Trial A) 
Controlling 
professors with 
network of insiders  
Protracting 
and 
protecting 
the 
recruitment 
over time 
The election of a new dean or control systems usually provokes a strong debate, but otherwise professors are very free in their 
discipline. The university is so compartmentalized that professors do not poke their noses into others’ business. (Professor 
Alpha, TV  interview*) 
Exploiting weak 
peer review system 
In a testimony, Professor [C] stated that: “over the years, I have noticed that new students replaced those who had historically 
performed all the threats. But this did not gainsay our perception that they all belonged to the same organization, and therefore 
that it was in our best interest to remain silent (Full Verdict, Trial A) 
Professor [K]’s behaviour is indicative of the climate of intimidation at Troy. Only a few hours after denouncing threats to the 
police, s/he retracted the allegations, arguing: “I probably gave too much importance to the events” (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A)  
Exploiting victim’s 
code of silence 
The infiltration of Troy went beyond exam marking. It was a means  to control the territory – to gain favours that other 
stakeholders would need to repay in different forms (Congressman C, Antimafia Commission proceeding) 
A key university supplier was by a clan member. Wiretapped conversations demonstrated that this person actively promised to 
“find jobs” for [stakeholders] in the University in exchange for appropriate favours (Arrest Warrant 1, Trial A) 
The clan did not forget the favours made for its students, asking to be “paid back” by promoting the role of clan intermediaries 
at Troy University (Verdict, Trial A) 
Student [X] joined the business, developing her own network of students that could be “helped”. Using her connection with 
Student/Member [F], [X] signalled a list of students that were willing to pay large sums of money to her. [X] would then share 
some of its profits with [F], who would eventually recruit professors for the misconduct (Verdict, Trial A) 
Gaining students’ 
and stakeholders’ 
support 
 
* Note: The reported interview came before Trials A and B, and described events happening during the early stages of the clan’s infiltration in Troy. The informant did not intend 
to allude that the professors’ resistance was connected to the clan. The information is useful instead to describe (i) the existence of a professional struggle to implement peer 
reviews and (ii) a ‘normal’ climate of research and teaching, where professors could operate at high-level. 
 
